Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice.
For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature.
Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men.
Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.
Objection 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many."
But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above ( AA , 6).
Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.
Objection 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community.
Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case.
Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."
I answer that, As stated above  (A ), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person.
Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.
Reply to Objection 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others.
As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately.
Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect.
For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part."
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."
Reply to Objection 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other.
Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.