Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things.
For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect.
But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above  (A ).
Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary.
Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Objection 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent.
For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things.
Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past.
Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary.
Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Objection 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours.
But no future contingent things must necessarily be.
Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i. e. of men.
Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will.
Therefore God knows future contingent things.
I answer that, Since as was shown above  (A ), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down.
In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge.
Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it.
Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself.
And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously.
The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above ( Q , A ).
Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary.
So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future.
This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow.
On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition.
Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false.
For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent.
Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary.
Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.
But this is to no purpose.
For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow."
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul.
For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.
Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i. e. as it is in its presentiality.
And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time.
Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time.
Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way.
Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us.
Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.
Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying.
If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary."
If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition,'that which is known by God is'is necessary."
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing is black" can never be true.
But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false.
Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known.
This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.